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726 preferred to humbly ask permission to pass beyond toward the Ili River. Erali pretended to consent but had the intention of striking
[663] a most terrible blow against the fleeing prince after having lulled him into security to some extent. And this is exactly what happened. Scarcely had the Kalmuks moved away from the Kazaks and set up their camp to spend the night when Erali and his allies attacked them abruptly, annihilated whole groups which had gone
[727] to sleep without taking precautions, and took an immense booty of prisoners, various objects, and livestock. The third part of the Great Horde, which had camped in the neighborhood of Tashkent from the time of Galdan Tsyren, did not move after the annihilation of the Dzungars but began to establish itself on the spot in the localities it occupied, and persecuted the neighboring cities and villages more strongly. Tashkent was the city which suffered most. Raids, the pillage of caravans, and the almost complete loss of arable lands brought about the absolute ruin of its inhabitants. Although they were not subjects of the Kazaks, they were dependent upon them for everything and were obliged to purchase all the necessities of life and trade from them at a high price.

In 1760 a large number of Karakalpaks [Kara-Kalpak] joined this part of the Great Horde. These Karakalpaks lived at the mouth of the Syr [Darya] River, but being hemmed in by the Little Horde, especially under Khan Nurali, they had retreated further east. It is not known why the Kazaks, who were so powerful, did not seize Tashkent completely and establish themselves there. But there is no doubt that this city has had to suffer from their aggressions until our day. The khans of this country, being weak and unenterprising, have tried to avert these raids by favors, gifts, and concessions more than by resistance and
● [829] vigorous measures. The Kazaks are accustomed to viewing indulgence as [163] a sign of weakness, and consequently this kind of behavior, far from disarming them, leads them to renewed violence.

Tashkent proved the truth of this by its own experience some time later when Iunus Khodja became ruler of this city.

173 61 security, and this obscurity which itself is part and parcel of the myth, supplies its needed extra-historical context, and removes it from the domain of verifiable human experience. The genealogy becomes mythical by its very scope: one must believe it to accept it, and one accepts the myth to the extent that one accepts membership in the group. The myth does not, in this sense, counterfeit history; rather, the myth transcends history and the genealogy in thus supplying the substance of the myth transcends history in its own fashion for it has also transcended itself.

● 829 611 Turkic savants, such as Abulgasi, or the brilliant 19th century Kazakh scholar, Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, understood the working of the two types of temporal sequence and their mutual relations very well. Valikhanov demonstrates his knowledge of objective history and its interpretation, and his control of the meaning of the principle of descent. He describes the principle of descent as patrilineal, and seniority within a number of patrilineally related groups as governed by the principle of primogeniture. These principles have, both in his conception as well as in that which is proposed here "...a completely genealogical significance. For this reason, the mode of relationship between hordes, and lineages within a horde among themselves correspond to the law of blood brotherhood, and the relationship of

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lineage to its horde is the relation of a son to the father in the case of the senior line of the horde."[12] That is, hordes act as persons, lineages act as persons, senior lineages are as father to filial junior lineages, mutually ranked according to the principle of primogeniture operating among the founders. In the same passage, Valikhanov finds operative among lineages and hordes the relationship of uncle to nephew, the significance of which will be left to later discussion of cognatic relationships. It is interesting, although not by itself decisive, that another characteristic of corporate structures, their status as persons, is also implied by Valikhanov.[13] It is not decisive because evidently Valikhanov is consistently arguing by analogy from relationships within the family, such as fraternal, filial, paternal, avuncular-nepotal, etc., in order to account for relationships among descent groups. But it is consistent with the total picture that such an analogy is available, and in fact necessary for the Kazakh philosopher to account for his system of social relations.

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[12] Valikhanov, 286.

[13] Lévi-Strauss in his article, Social Structure, discusses the use of native as opposed to scientific models of the social structure of a society. Valikhanov affords an instance of a native model with a significant advantage, that he has described a conceptual scheme which integrates family, lineage, and other relations. The five Confucian relations likewise are called to mind as examples of native models of this order.

619 they had names which harked back to the Chingisside era. Valikhanov draws an important implication from this: inasmuch as membership in any horde was based on ancestry, the union as a whole has a genealogical significance. The instances of Chingisside ancestry are not of the same order as the indigenous ones, therefore,[49] for they are properly speaking fictitious.

619 428 643 829 The direct patrilineal descendants of the Kazakh nobility who brought the original confederation to life are located by Kazakh tradition in the Little Horde.[50] We know that the Little Horde was not an original founding member of the confederation of hordes, but was rather the junior member. So reads the Kazakh tradition reported by Valikhanov, and which must be accepted as a primary datum. Therefore the location of the original founder of the entire Kazakh confederation in the Little Horde depends on the application of another principle to regularize or legitimize the rank order of the Little Horde among the other hordes. The legitimizing principle according to which they sought to align the objective historical reality known to at least some Kazakhs is that of ultimogeniture. The Mongol law, according to Valikhanov, was still regarded as being in force through

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[49] Idem.

[50] Ibid., 292.

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transmission via Khan Tiavka (c. 1700). This law decreed that the right of succession to the father's status and to his residuary possessions, went to the youngest son or to the youngest male family member; so Valikhanov claimed.[51] N.B.: we are in possession both of the Mongol law code--the Great Yassa of Chingis Khan--and of the code transmitted by Khan Tiavka. The provisions of these codes relative to the inheritance of the father's seniority in no way corresponds to the version given here by Valikhanov. On the contrary, while the principle of ultimogeniture applied to the residual corporeal properties of the father and a special title, not that of the father, the youngest son did not inherit his offices, rank, titles, social position, and
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other incorporeal properties.[52] But the important thing is not the actual facts, namely the content of the codes and decrees, but what the 19th century Kazakh believed them to be; what he chose to make of them in the interests of establishing a social order, a ranking of the hordes, corresponding to other considerations. And in order to legitimize the realization of those other considerations, by assigning the priority to the founders of the Little Horde, a double fiction was applied. First,

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[51] Idem.

[52] Riasanovsky, Customary Laws, 7 ff; ibid., Fundamental Principles, 83 ff.

619 there is the fiction that the Little Horde was the senior
643 horde by virtue of the direct patrilineal descent of its
829 nobility from the original Kazakh nobility. Second, there is the fiction of ultimogeniture, which, as a principle for the establishment of seniority, was imputed to law codes despite the fact that the principle in this form is nonexistent.

619 The clans which composed the hordes were common des-
173 cent groups, whose structure was analogous to the corporation.[53] The clan's charter of incorporation is the genealogy, which may be real or fictive, that is, assigned to newcomers added to the clan, i.e., to one of its composite lineages. These genealogies were handed down by oral tradition and formed part of a larger set of oral traditions embodying the myths which gave expression to the unity of the group. It is not to be expected that these oral traditions would have the accuracy of written history. Quite the contrary, they might vary in every detail from each other as reported by two different Kazakhs, and this would still not alter in the least their validity as genealogies, for these genealogies

[53]Here I have in mind Fortes' exposition of the corporate character of the lineage, which I am in turn applying to the clan, for the same principles are at work: the corporation is a person; the corporation never dies (Henry Maine); it has rules of membership and admission to membership (Weber); and it has a center of authority (Weber). The last criterion is more applicable to the clan than the lineage. Fortes, Structure of Unilineal Descent Groups, 17-41.

These apparent contradictions arise because Kazakh society is an amalgam of kin and political relationships.

Soviet writers in Central Asia find it difficult to explain the inconsistencies in Kazakh society; this difficulty is due in part to the series of readymade categories of evolution which Communism teaches. They are dealing not with abstractions but with living people, whose lives are complex. The Kazakhs have lived on the margins of great empires—Persian, Chinese, Russian—for many centuries. They themselves have participated in great empires, their own and others'. Not only the glory, but some of the institutions, have rubbed off on them; they have developed certain institutions which are normally part of states and empires. At times they have formed states and empires, and at times they have contracted to form smaller units.

During the 1920's, a group of Kazakh intellectuals, together with certain romantically disposed Russians, constructed a picture of Kazakh society in which each social unit formed a closely-knit cooperative core. All members of a village helped each other, since all were united by ties of blood and neighborhood. The Kazakh intellectuals included former leaders, such as Baitursunov and Bukeikhanov, of the Alash-Orda, the Kazakh political party of the period 1917-1922. Ryskulov and Sadvokasov, also Kazakhs, propounded the same idea; the Russian scholars Polochanskii, Kushner, and, as late as 1933, Fedorov continued along the same line.[1]

With the onset of collectivization, the Soviet government could no longer let these theories continue unopposed. In 1926 Moscow began to denounce the notion of the persistence of primeval communist conditions among the Kazakhs into the era of the Russian Revolution. The Soviet boss of Kazakhstan, Goloshchekin, attacked the concept of the Kazakh nomadic village as a communal, cooperative, undifferentiated whole. Between 1928 and 1930 the government of Kazakhstan handed over each year to the GPU hundreds of Kazakh families classified as enemies of the workers. The campaign to exterminate the rich Kazakhs as exploiters of the poor intensified between 1930 and 1933. The aim of this campaign was to bring the Kazakh herdsman into collective farm life, to settle him down as a tiller of the soil, as well as to find the equivalents among the Kazakhs of the rich peasants of Russia. The aul was equated by Goloshchekin with a peasant village anywhere; the wealthy Kazakh villager was equated with the Kulak, and thus regarded as subject to liquidation.[2]

This policy became the official line, and the forces advocating the theory of communal economy and polity were silenced. One theory advanced in support of the new line stated that the Tsarist colonialists supported the village leaders as a counterpoise to the khans and the sultans, and used the local leader as a lever to crush the rule of the khans. According to this theory, the khans were of foreign birth and the village leaders, pictured as allies of the Tsars, were of Kazakh birth.[3]

[1]Tagzhanov, 1934, pp. 6-8, 23.
[2]Goloshchekin, 1931, pp. 177-198, 208.
[3]Tagzhanov, 1934, pp. 38-39.